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Executive Summary
The intergovernmental relationship between the federal district and the national
government has been given little significance in the subject of intergovernmental
relations. This purpose of this paper is to compare the intergovernmental relationship
between two federal districts in the United States and Brazil. The paper begins with a
definition of federalism and its key characteristics along with an explanation of the
fundamental changes in the system. This is followed by a discussion of the concepts of
intergovernmental relations as defined by Deil S. Wright. The models of
intergovernmental relations are used to explain the relationship between the federal
districts and the national government by analyzing their legislative, administrative, and
fiscal decentralization. The study proposes a model of an intergovernmental relationship
between the District of Columbia and the United States Congress, and assesses the
autonomy levels of both the federal districts of Brazil and the United States.
Intergovernmental relation is an area of political science concerned with the
analysis of relationship between the different levels of government. In the United States,
the federal and state governments receive their respective authority from the Constitution.
Also, local governments are the creatures of their states, and therefore receive their
autonomy from their state constitutions. In Brazil, however, the federal, state, and local
governments obtain their respective autonomy from the national constitution. In view of
this, Brasilia, the federal district of Brazil, is recognized as a state; whereas, in the United
States, the District of Columbia is seen as a local government under the full control of the
i

U.S. Congress. Comparatively, Brasilia has more autonomy than the District of
Columbia, and this is evident in the congressional repudiation of legislation passed by the
D.C. Council. The existing relationship between the District of Columbia and the United
States Congress is depicted as a dominant authoritative model because the powers of
Congress influences every decision made within the District.
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A Comparative Study of Intergovernmental Relations of two Federal
Districts: The Case of the U.S. District of Columbia and Brasília, Brazil

Introduction
Few scholars consider the interaction between the District of Columbia and Congress
when discussing or assessing federalism and intergovernmental relations in the United States of
America. Due to the absence of discussion, the purpose of this paper is to compare the
intergovernmental relations of two federal districts in the United States and Brazil. A policy
assessment—scientific assessment of the policy documents—for both districts are matched with
historical occurrences that exhibit traits in an aim to solidify an illustration for the relationship
between the District of Columbia and the United States Congress.
In the United States, the subject of intergovernmental relations is the study of the
interaction between national and subnational governments, or, more specifically an analysis of
the interaction, attitudes, and behavior between the national, state, and local echelons of
government with the aim of expounding upon the respective roles, responsibilities, and
influences of each tier of government (O'Toole, 2007; Rosenthal and Hoefler, 1989). Within this
arena of study, there has been successful clarification on the outcome, effect, and reaction to
implemented policies and legislation in each tier of government. The 10th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution confers upon the states, “those powers not delegated to the federal government
in the Constitution nor prohibited by the same,” Dillon’s rule regarding the authority of local
governments has verified that a local government is a creature of the state, and possesses no
power unless it is conferred by the state (Wright, 2007, 73).
The dynamic between different tiers of government is rooted in the separation of powers
conceived by the federal system—federalism. The possible tyranny of the majority is a serious
1

concern for any nation, thus federalism brings forth a stable nation and protects individuals
against political authorities that constrain state sovereignty (Watts, 1998). The premise of
federalism supports the idea of a decentralized government that allocates to every tier of
government its own areas to govern. Decentralization is also a means to attain purported goals
(Fleurke and Willemese, 2004). Autonomy is the result from governments operating within their
own prerogatives and is the aim of federalism by way of decentralization. Autonomy—the right
to self-govern within the range of power afforded—is very important to subnational
governments. The most powerful act of autonomy for a subnational government, aside from its
constitutional rights, is the ability to collect its own revenues from localities such as income and
property tax (Shock, 2009). In addition, autonomy gives subnational governments the freedom to
avail matters most important to its constituents.
The system of governance in the District of Columbia could be considered as
idiosyncratic in contrast to the archetypal form of hierarchy in the United States government.
The United States government is stratified into 3 levels—federal, state, and local. Contrary to the
common hierarchy of the federal system, in the District of Columbia, the hierarchy is best
explained as a federal-local relationship. The relationship between the District of Columbia and
Congress, to some, may be deemed the only example of a federal-local relationship in the United
States of America. Some may agree that other U.S. territories, such as Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, and Guam, have more autonomy than the District of Columbia. However, the
exclusive relationship between the District of Columbia and the federal government has not
fostered a relationship of benevolence for the residents of the District. Instead, the District has
tackled adverse quandaries with little legislative support from Congress, causing the District to
be in a position of doing little to ameliorate problems.
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In the past, critics have labeled the District’s government as one of the worst
governments in the nation (Niskanen, 1991). This criticism is based on the above average
expenditures per resident, the low performance of public schools, and the high rate of murder
and infant mortality, along with other measures of social pathology. However, most critics
trivialize the difficulties the District of Columbia encounters with its budget, education, and
legislation—all which can be attributed to its relationship with Congress. Although some of these
same disparities are prevalent today, it is important to understand the extent of the dictatorshiplike oversight the District has encountered while attempting to rectify fiscal issues. It is also
important to clearly understand how little home rule the District is granted in comparison to
other federal districts such as Mexico City, Abuja, and Brasília; therefore, limiting its ability to
cope.
Brasília, established as Brazil’s Federal District in 1960, is also a unique district. In 1988,
Brazil adopted a new constitution known today as the Constitution of the Federative Republic of
Brazil of 1988. The country’s 26 states and one federal district are recognized equally with the
same powers of governance (Afonso and de Mello 2000, 2). Empowered with equal recognition
under the constitution of 1988, every subordinate government operates under the same quantity
of home rule. The autonomy that Brasília has as a subnational government allows the
government to respond to matters within its jurisdiction without any intervention from the
national government.
The subject of intergovernmental relations has primarily focused on the federal-state and
state-local relationships. Consequently, there is a lack of literature acknowledging and analyzing
the federal-federal district or federal-local relationship. This paper begins with an exploration of
the subject of intergovernmental relations and the markers that define the different forms of
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vertical intergovernmental relationships. The overall purpose of this paper is to investigate and
assess the relationship between the District of Columbia and the United States Congress and
Brasília and Brazil’s national government.
The evaluated level of autonomy for both federal districts is then exhibited in a table that
evaluates the level of federalist qualities based on the privileges given to the District of
Columbia and that of Brasília through a review of the United States Constitution and the
Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 1988. Using previously identified models of
intergovernmental relationships and a comparative analysis of the federal similarities of the
United States and Brazil; the outcomes of this study are a model of the intergovernmental
relationship between the District Columbia and Congress, and a comparative analysis of a home
rule in Washington D.C. and Brasília.

Background
Overview of the Federations of Brazil and the United States of America
The United States of America, the first modern federation, adopted the U.S. Constitution in
1789 (Kennedy et al, 2000). Today, the United States consists of 50 states, one federal district, 6
territories, and 448 Native American domestic dependent nations (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 2000). As a decentralized nation, the distribution of power is separated between the
national and subnational governments as listed in the Constitution.
Since 1988, federalism has been a part of the Brazilian political system; however,
historically democratic practices were not ubiquitous (Luna and Klein, 2006, 28). It was not until
the early 1980s that democracy emerged and became a part of national politics in Brazil (Luna
Klein, 2006, 28). Soon after the implementation of the new constitution, decentralization of
4

many types became synonymous with the Brazilian political system. Therefore, over the past
quarter of a century, Brazil has established a “vibrant and functioning democratic system free
from military tutelage and populist politicians” (Luna and Klein, 2006, 1).
At one point in history, the federal capitals of both the United States and Brazil had no vote
in neither local nor national elections. In addition, the residents of both were not allowed to elect
representatives to the national Congress (Rowat, 1986). Both governments of the United States
and Brazil are systems that utilize multiple separations of power that combine constituent units
and have a general government; all governed by a national constitution. Each tier of the
government possesses powers that are delegated by the constitution and are empowered to deal
directly with citizens. Also, each country has national and subnational governments that are able
to exercise legislative, administrative, and taxing powers, as elected by citizens.

These

characteristics deem both countries capable of subnational comparisons for the purpose of this
paper.

Changes in the Federal Character of the U.S. Political System
Before moving forward with the application of decentralization characteristics to assess
intergovernmental relationships, it may be helpful to understand the evolution of federalism and
the widely accepted intergovernmental theories that draw on the elements of decentralization.
Linking the hierarchical nature of federalism—particularly the federal system in the United
States—to the relationships that develop between each tier of government aids in the delineation
of the atypical federal-federal district relationship.
The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes supported the institution of government but
opposed a federal system that utilized the division of power (O’Toole, 2007). James Madison,
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one of the Founding Fathers of the United States Constitution, considered the works of Hobbes
and decided that larger republics in lieu of small ones are better at preventing an internal tyranny
of the majority (Kincaid, 2004; O’Toole, 2007; Shock, 2009). However, others note that the U.S.
Constitution is “neither a national nor a federal Constitution but a mix of both” (Hail and Lange,
2010, 4). Nonetheless, most support that federalism is essential to avoiding a “tyranny of the
majority” where the rights and privileges of the minority group are voted away by the majority.
Therefore, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution developed a system that allowed states to retain
their status as independent governmental entities with corresponding self-governing jurisdictions
and autonomy (O’Toole, 2007; Shock, 2009). Thus, the U.S. Constitution was constructed to
“minimize instability, injustice, and confusion,” so a top-level federal government that shared
responsibilities with the states was established (O’Toole, 2007, 4).
Federalism is the term used to describe the relationship between the federal government
and the states (Shock, 2009). It seeks to preserve liberty by constitutionally divvying power into
systems of authority between central and regional governments (O’Toole, 2007; Peterson, 1995;
Shock 2009). When assessing decentralization, many scholars repudiated federalism as a
distribution of authority between governments, and redefined the term as a “process through
which authority is distributed and redistributed” (Rodden, 2004, 489). Despite the varying views,
the division of powers between the federal and state governments is outlined in the U.S.
Constitution; however, the Constitution does not specify the exact powers each level of
government retains (Shock, 2009).
In a federal political system, the following characteristics must be present: (1) the legal
status of each tier of government has to be guaranteed by a national constitution; (2) each tier of
government is responsible for making and implementing policies in important areas; (3) each tier
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of government must have separate political officials, elections, and law making capabilities; (4)
each tier of government must have its own bureaucracy; and (5) characteristics of a federal
political system at all levels of government where each tier has individual fiscal autonomy in
taxing and spending must be present (Brzinski, Lancaster, and Tuschhoff, 1999; O’Toole, 2007).
The different models of federalism can be used to explain the national-sub-national
intergovernmental relationship.

The first model, dual federalism, began when the U.S.

Constitution was enacted. During this era, 1789 to 1933, the United States held a central focus on
agriculture, and citizens did not look to the government for much assistance. At the local level,
there was an unconventional dynamic between governance, politics, and commerce; citizens also
rarely depended on the city government for decisions that mattered most (Rae, 2003;
Zimmermann, 2010). The local citizenry viewed good business as good government and often
business leaders were recruited to aid in the management of city government, thus, producing a
business-like regime of governance subnationally (Rae, 2003; Zimmermann, 2010).
Through the progression of time and the occurrence of the Great Depression, the desire to
develop and strengthen the infrastructure of the nation evolved. That desire led to the rise of dual
federalism represented by a system where two different levels of government operated
independently within its separate jurisdiction without relying on the other for assistance or
authorization, each in its own sphere sovereign (Leach, 1970: Rosenthal and Hoefler, 1989;
O’Toole, 2007; Shock 2009). Alternative views of dual federalism are not as clear, but support
for the term as an “ambiguous overlap of responsibilities within the two levels of government” is
acknowledged (O’Toole, 2007, 6). However, in a genuine dual system:
Congress must possess only enumerated powers and may employ those powers to
promote only a few purposes. Within their respective spheres, Congress and the
states are sovereign and equal. Neither Congress nor a state legislature may
nullify an act of the other or employ coercive powers against the other plane.
7

Changes in the power distribution between the two planes of government can be
accomplished only by constitutional amendments. Inter-plane relations are
minimal as each Congress and each state legislature operates autonomously by
employing its respective enumerated or reserved powers. Congress and a state
legislature each possess the power to tax and borrow funds (Zimmerman, 2001,
18).
The theory of a genuine dual system was developed from the Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) and
Abelman v. Booht (1859) Supreme Court cases. As a result, dual federalism is valid because
Congress possesses a number of autonomous powers that does not safeguard the states from
formal or informal congressional encroachment (Super, 2005).
During the epoch of dual federalism, the U.S. Congress supported the clause that the
federal government can participate in acts that are not directly declared in the Constitution;
however, the actions must be directly linked to the enumerated powers. Overall, during the era of
dual federalism there were three apparent states. The rivalistic mercantilism state, where the
“behavior of the federal system conformed closely to the juridical model of dual federalism”
(Scheiber, 2007, 68). The transitional centralization state had a “significant centralization of real
power” (Scheiber, 2007, 68).

And, the third is the accelerating centralization state. The

accelerating centralization state has “successive federal laws that advanced national regulation,
and the Supreme Court continued to censor state legislation with the heavy hand” (Scheiber,
2007, 68).
Unlike dual federalism that has clear-cut layers of responsibility, the second model,
cooperative federalism refers to a federal system where the layers of responsibility are
intertwined.

In the cooperative federalism model, there are apparent “systems of sharing,

ranging from federal-state agreements covering specific programs to informal contacts on a
regular basis for the sharing of information and experience” (Zimmerman, 2001, 18).
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Cooperative federalism, was noticeable in the U.S. political system from 1933 to the
1960s. Cooperative federalism was ushered in by the collapse of the stock market that later led to
a time where banks lost most of their capital. Then, the Great Depression began and the Franklin
D. Roosevelt Administration implemented a series of New Deal programs (Scheiber, 1980;
Shock, 2009). These New Deal programs regulated the stock market and created welfare, Social
Security, and Medicare benefits, to name a few. The states had no choice but to cooperate with
the decisions of the federal government once the New Deal programs were enacted (Shock,
2009). These changes along with others such as the War on Poverty, enacted by President
Lyndon B. Johnson, required the transfer of federal funding to the states and cooperation
between both levels of government to accomplish goals (O’Toole, 2007; Shock, 2009; Staten
1993). Furthermore, the emergence of cooperative federalism reconstructed intergovernmental
relations in the United States. In a clear cooperative national-state system:
Each plane of government possesses certain autonomous powers that may be
exercised cooperatively, with such cooperation initiated by either plane. One
plane of government does not coerce the other plane of government. The roles of
Congress in terms of national-state relations are facilitating and leadership ones.
Congress uses its power to regulate interstate commerce to assist states by
prohibiting use of such commerce in violation of state laws. And, cooperation is
negotiated. (Zimmerman, 2001, 20)
Beginning in the 1960s, the centralized, regulatory, and cooperative federalism models
were utilized. This phase of federalism transformed governance by bringing forth great changes.
During this era, segregation was abolished due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Education of 1954. In fact, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 changed the relationship
between the federal and state governments, and provoked the federal government to begin using
coercive means to garner the cooperation of the states—paving the way for the rise of fiscal
federalism.

Under fiscal federalism, the third intergovernmental relationship, the federal
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government provided funding to the states to address specific needs such as repairing and
building bridges.
Intertwined with fiscal federalism is the fourth philosophy of “New Federalism” that
arose during the administration of President Ronald Reagan (Wissert, Stenbergy, and Colez,
2009; Brown 1982; Caraley and Schlussel 1986). The period of new federalism, from 1980 to
1995, contains significant acts of decentralization and fiscal reduction with an increase in federal
sanctions, mandates, and preemptions from Congress. Some of the most important
intergovernmental events of this era were, the ending of the General Revenue Sharing Program
and the Garcia v San Antonio (1976) Supreme Court decision that applied the Fair Labor
Standards Act to civil service employees (Wissert, Stenbergy, and Colex, 2009).
Although some note that coercive federalism was present prior to the 1990s, coercive
federalism is most apparent during the George H. Bush Presidency (Cho and Wright 2001;
Kincaid 1990). During the Bush, era there was a centralizing effect on the United States federal
system. With coercive federalism, intergovernmental regulations can oscillate from direct orders
to indirect actions that force change at the subnational level (Posner, 2007). The Unfunded
Mandate Reform Act of 1995 catapulted the coercive era leading to the nationalization and
centralization of education policy, welfare reform, the administration of elections, tax policy, and
the establishment of national standards on homeland security (Posner, 2007).
Federalism and intergovernmental relations in the United States has morphed over the
course of time allowing scholars to forge descriptors for theories pertaining to the relationships
between governments that will be used in this study. Although these interpretations apply to the
federal-state relationship, the chronicled attributes are necessary for the author’s application in
the explaining the relationship between Congress and the District of Columbia.
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The Effect of Decentralization and Centralization on Intergovernmental Relations
The ever-present dichotomy between centralization and decentralization is a perplexing
issue ensuing the question of whether increasing the power of a central government is best for its
citizens. Notwithstanding, the issue of centralization versus decentralization is more a question
of “proportion” than any other concern (Shafritz, Ott, and Jang, 2005, 55). In order to define both
terms as it applies to federalism, everything that goes toward increasing the importance of the
subnational government’s role is decentralization, whereas, everything that goes toward
decreasing the subnational government’s role is centralization (Shafritz, Ott, and Jang, 2005;
Chapman 1973).
Central government’s decisions must coincide with the demands of the subnational units;
this is a supportive idea behind federalism (Rodden, 2004). Rodden has found that federalism is
positively correlated with measures of expenditure, revenue, borrowing, policy, and political
decentralization. Federalism heightens the growth of government because new tiers, resources,
and responsibilities will be required.
Decentralization may pose a risk to policies, due to its ability to engender complications
with the allocation of resources, efficiency, and efficacy (Prud’homme, 1995). Decentralization
is often viewed as a shift of authority towards subnational governments and away from the
national government (Peterson 1997; Rodden, 2004). The decision by a national government to
increase the power of subnational governments is very significant. However, a shift in
sovereignty has major policy implications not only for who governs, but for whom in the system
(or any system).
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The reasons and explanations for decentralization can be broadly categorized as relating
to political (federalism, democracy, and political power), or economic factors such as fiscal
relationships and the efficiency of federal political systems (Escobar-Lemmon, 2001). Recent
studies have found that decentralization and federalism are both associated with higher levels of
perceived corruption, larger government, macroeconomic instability, and under some conditions,
lower growth (Rodden, 2004). Moreover, many still agree that decentralization brings the
government closer to its constituents (Peterson 1997; Stepan 2000). However, it is only a
framework that requires the incorporation of polices that encourage constituent participation
(Peterson 2000).
Centralization—the restriction of fiscal autonomy to a national or superior government—
can occur through conditional grants, regulations governing subnational taxation, and through
formal limitations on subnational borrowing (Rodden, 2004). These forms of fiscal conditions
restrict budgetary autonomy and positively correlates with measures of expenditure and revenue
decentralization; therefore, they are negatively correlated with transfer-dependence (Rodden,
2004). Additionally, “the erosion of federalism by centralization produces a socially
interventionist national government that corrupts society, diminishes freedom, and undermines
individual liberty” (Kincaid, 2004, 71).
Policy decentralization limits the legal rights that national government has to override the
decisions and policies of subnational levels of government. In fact, total policy decentralization
is never recognized, and shared authority is existent because it is rare for central governments to
fully cede autonomy to subnational governments (Rodden, 2004).
However, three dimensions of decentralization are palpable and can be identified as
administrative, fiscal, and comprehensive. Administrative decentralization in a federal system

12

transfers administrative powers to deliver services at the subnational level, and adjudicates
bureaucratic form to the subnational government (Peterson 1997; González, 2008). Fiscal
decentralization relies on the potential of subnational resources to cover expenditures in the
subnational budget (González, 2008). Whereas, comprehensive decentralization, in a federal
system, includes a “full transfer of responsibilities and executive powers to the democratically
elected subnational governments, in addition to the corresponding resources for public services
and social programs” (González, 2008).

Dillon’s Rule and Deil S. Wright’s Models of Intergovernmental Relationships
Home rule is the ability of a subnational government to act and make policy in all areas
that have not been designated to be of the superior government’s interest through general law,
constitutional provisions, initiatives, and referenda. The ability to self-govern for a subnational
government is predicated on the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety,
morals, and welfare, along with the authority to license, to tax, and to incur debt (Shock, 2004).
The home-rule approach of governance serves to increase local autonomy and flexibility
(Stephens and Wikstrom, 2007). The possession of fiscal, structural, functional, and personal
home rule is very important when attempting to implement approaches that are crucial to
subnational governance. Home rule is very important for accurate implementation of the public
choice approach of regional governance because, without subnational home rule, the laws of the
superior government would dictate all the local decisions.
The Deil Wright’s models that define intergovernmental relationships are based on
correspondence and authority patterns. The structure of authority can be defined by
characteristics that exhibit hierarchy, bargaining, or autonomy. Whereas, the relationship can be

13

explained by defining operational factors between each tier of government as independent,
dependent, or interdependent. The widely accepted rule for local governments are as follows:
“There is no common-law right of self-government; local entities are creatures of the state,
subject to creation and abolition, and the unfettered discretion of the state; localities may
exercise only those powers expressly granted; and localities are mere tenants at the will of the
legislature,” and are used as the common rules for all models (Wright, 2007, 73).
As previously mentioned, in gauging the styles of authority, there are three main types:
autonomous, bargaining, and hierarchical. The autonomous authority model has distinct
boundaries between the different levels of government and supports the notion that the federalstate layer of government is independent and sovereign. The hierarchical authority model is built
on the premise that there is a dependency relationship between the three levels of government. In
this model, states and localities are seen as creatures of the national government that is based on
a systematic way of studying behavior and assumes that all participants strive to optimize their
own behaviors (Wright, 2007). However, the overall terminating decision is one where everyone
makes a gain.
The bargaining authority model creates a limit in the dispersal of power, uncertain areas
of autonomy, a high degree of interdependence, simultaneous competition and cooperation,
bargaining/exchange relationships, and negotiation toward agreements (O’Toole, 2007). The
bargaining authority model has the following characteristics: (1) areas of government operation
involving national, state, and local units simultaneously; (2) the areas of autonomy or singlejurisdictions are independent and full discretion are comparatively small; and (3) the power and
influence available to any one jurisdiction is significantly limited (Wright, 2007, 82).
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Finally, the autonomous authority level, views the state and national governments as
having sovereign authority with distinct separation of responsibilities, and both levels have
peripheral areas of connection.

Literature Review
Washington District of Columbia, U.S.A
Limits on the acquisition of power produces an authority pattern best described as
bargaining. The United States Constitution, a document that is the supreme law of the United
States of America, allocates powers to both the federal and state governments. The federal
government possesses enumerated and implied powers as listed in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 118 of the Constitution (Wright, 1988). As stated in the Constitution, Congress has the right to
“exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District as may, by cessation of
particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the
United States.” This means that the U.S. Congress has complete and total jurisdiction over the
governance of the District of Columbia, leaving the District with limited autonomy.
In 1791, the Washington District of Columbia was established on land ceded by the states
of Maryland, and Virginia. Approximately ten years later, on December 1, 1800 the capital of the
United States of America was relocated from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to the area along the
Potomac River that included sections of the states of Maryland, and Virginia; the Virginia
portion was retroceded in 1847 (Cityhood for D.C., 2010). It is from the date of its inception that
the District began intergovernmental contention with Congress. Constitutional powers bestowed
upon Congress restricted the will of the District government and its residents. Per District of
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Columbia’s restrictions, Congress can control the physical appearance and political landscape of
the District (O’Cleireacain, 1997).
From 1820 to 1871, Congress imposed a territorial form of government (Jost, 1996).
Throughout these five decades, residents received representation through a single non-voting
delegate in Congress (Dodd, 2004; Democracy or Distrust, 1997). In addition, the President of
the United States retained the power to appoint the governor, the governor’s council, the board of
public works, and the board of public health for the District (Jost, 1996,).

This form of

governance was difficult to maintain, therefore, Congress abolished the entire district governance
system. As an alternative, the use of a three-commissioner board was adopted (Jost, 1996). The
three-commissioner board remained in place for almost a century; while the District residents
had no representation in Congress and were not allowed to vote in national elections (Democracy
or Distrust, 2007). With no voting right previously established, residents of the District of
Columbia petitioned Congress for a municipal charter (District of Columbia Self-Government,
2007). Congress granted a municipal charter that conferred on the District government the
authority to establish a Council, and the privileges to levy taxes and appoint a mayor. In 1963,
residents in the District of Columbia won the right to vote in the national election (O’Cleireacian,
1997), and to elect a non-voting delegate in the House of Representatives (Dodd, 2004;
Democracy or Distrust, 2007, 2043). However, it was not until 1973 that Congress approved the
District of Columbia Self-Government and Government Reorganization Act (also known as
Home Rule Act, 1973). The Home Rule Act granted the District the right to elect a mayor and
members of its own legislative branch, the D.C. Council.
Today, the District’s government regulates with the powers granted by Congress. These
powers are specifically detailed in the Home Rule Act of 1973. However, there are important
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areas for achieving subnational autonomy that Congress has retained control. Congress has
granted the District the right to develop a budget but with the stipulation that “such budget so
adopted shall be submitted by the Mayor to the President for transmission by him to the
Congress” (Home Rule Act, 1973, 31). In addition, no amount of funds may be “obligated or
expended by any officer or employee of the District of Columbia government unless such
amount has been approved by an Act of Congress, and then only according to such Act” (Home
Rule Act, 1973, 31). This means that the U.S. Congress has full control over all revenues and
expenditures by annually reviewing the entire District government budget.
An act of Congress is required for the District to hire any employee on a full-time or parttime basis (Home Rule Act, 1973). Congress requires the appointment of an auditor who is
“responsible for conducting a thorough audit of the accounts and operations of District
government” (Home Rule Act, 1973, 41). In addition, the auditor must submit all audit reports to
the Congress, the Mayor, and the D.C. Council (Home Rule Act, 1973, 42).
Undoubtedly, the issuance of the Home Rule Act has granted the District more
responsibilities than it has seen in its approximately 200-year existence. The retention of
constitutional authority by the Senate disengages the purpose of the Act. In addition, to the
previously listed, Congress reinstates its retention of constitutional power to amend or repeal any
law enforced in the District prior to or after the enactment of the Home Rule Act and any act
already passed by the Council (Home Rule Act, 1973). At any time, Congress can reclaim all
governance over the District. Until reclamation occurs, Congress explicitly states that the D.C.
Council has no authority to:
Impose any tax on property of the United States or any of the states; Lend the public
credit for support of any private undertaking; Enact, amend, or repeal any, Act of
Congress that concerns the functions or property of the United States; Impose any tax on
the whole or any portion of the personal income of any individual not a resident of the
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District; Enact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to the organization and jurisdiction
of the District of Columbia Courts; that permits the building of any structure within the
District in excess of the height limitation contained in section 5 of the Act of June 16,
1947; with respect to the Commission on Mental Health; relating to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia; with respect to any provision relating to criminal
procedure and crimes and treatment of prisoners; and with respect to the District of
Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority (Home Rule
Act, 1973, 65).
Due to the explicit list of privileges withheld from the District’s jurisdiction, the United States
government supervises many of the governmental and financial functions that occur. Some
critics question whether the actions of Congress exemplify democracy or distrust (Democracy or
Distrust, 1998, 2046). Although, “democracy is blamed for the problems of the District;
structural inequities in the relationship between the District and Congress are a major cause of
the District’s troubles” (Democracy or Distrust, 2007, 2046).

Washington District of Columbia Current Situations
The District of Columbia’s government has attempted to deal with a plethora of issues.
Some of those issues are most prevalent in areas of fiscal, educational, and public health matters.
The restraining arm of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act of 1973, that require all laws
passed by the D.C. Council to undergo Congressional approval has placed Washington D.C. at
the clutches of the U.S. Congress (Democracy or Distrust, 1998). Furthermore, the District’s
residents have continuously campaigned for representation in Congress. Although residents have
received representation in the House of Representatives, they have received little support and no
approvals for representation in the Senate. There are many points of contention between
Congress and the District such as: policing and dealing with exceedingly high murder rates, the
elevation of HIV/AIDS cases, and the ever-present abortion issue, not to mention also the racial
implications from the disparity in unemployment rates. The responses from Congress have led to
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some victories for the District of Columbia; however, many of the approvals from Congress for
legislation have proven to arrive at times when the issues have already exacerbated beyond the
reach of the rule.

The District’s Attempt to Fund Abortion
In 1990, the District government attempted to fund abortion procedures for poor women
(Dewar, 1990). Therefore, a provision to fund the policy issue was incorporated into the 1991
fiscal year budget. During the same time, Congress was attempting to gain support for national
legislation that would transmit aid to Panama and Nicaragua. Due to pressure from the President
and a means to gain support for the national legislation, Congress dropped the language that
would allow the district to use local funds to help finance abortions for poor women as a measure
to gain congressional support for aid to Panama and Nicaragua (Dewar, 1990).
Adamant about the necessity of the abortion provision, the District reinserted the clause
to use local funds to support abortions in its 1995 fiscal year budget (Wheeler, 1994).
Nevertheless, in 1995, Congress ended the five-year opposition to the District’s use of ownsource tax revenue to fund abortions for city residents by issuing a congressional mandate. The
congressional mandate became the tightest restriction ever on abortion, making the District the
only jurisdiction in the country with a congressional imposed ban (American Health Line, 1995;
Wheeler, 1994).

The District’s Fight Against HIV/AIDS
Many studies on needle exchange programs have confirmed that providing clean needles
to drug users can be an effective means of preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS (Akhter 1994).
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The District of Columbia has had exceedingly high rates of intravenous drug user cases since the
late 1980s. Understanding the correlation between needle sharing and the spread of disease, the
District attempted to deal with its HIV/AIDS epidemic earlier on by using city funds to support a
needle exchange program. However, despite the District’s efforts, the House of Representatives
voted against the initiative (Lipton, 1999). It was not until 2007, when the District was found to
have the highest HIV/AIDS rate in the nation, that Congress supported the needle exchange
program. This caused a lift in the needle ban restricting and the District was allowed to use its
own tax dollars to provide clean needles to drug addicts (Levine and Sheridan, 2007).

District of Columbia Commuter Tax
Commuter taxes are common among many local jurisdictions, most common in New
York City until 1999, and in Philadelphia. The idea is to tax the income or wages of individuals
who are working in a jurisdiction that they do not live in (Shock, 2009). The commuter tax is
usually used by local governments to help pay for public services, alleviating a tax burden on
local residents and increasing the attractiveness of living in an area that one works (Jenkins and
Bell, 1990). In the early 1990s, the idea of imposing a commuter tax was a subject of discussion
among the District’s politicians. However, the District’s bid to a commuters tax was denied by a
federal appeals court with a ruling that, “the imposition of tax without the approval of Congress
is unconstitutional” (Weiss, 2005).

Taxation in the District
As stated in the Home Rule Act of 1973, the District of Columbia is not allowed to
impose a commuter tax on people that do not live in the District but commute into the District to
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work. Adding to the tax limitations, the federal government owns 41 percent of the property in
the District (O’Cleireacain, 1997). Due to McCulloch v. Maryland case of 1819, that prohibits
one government to tax another, the District is not allowed by law to collect property tax from the
federal government for all the federal buildings that reside in its jurisdiction. Property tax, a very
important source of revenue to local governments, provides autonomy; however, the District’s
range of autonomy is abridged. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study in 2003
identified that the District of Columbia:
Has a structural imbalance, ranging form $470,000,000 to $1,100,000,000 annually, and
that this imbalance is caused by mandates and legislation, and other requirements
imposed by the Federal Government …The components of the structural deficit are all
Federal origin and consist of the following: Locally provided services to the Federal
Government; a Federal statues which exempts the District from taxing 66 percent of the
income earned in the District; the exemption from taxation of 42 percent of the real
property owned by the Federal Government; and the requirement to provide State
services, such as special education and mental health, although the District is not a State
(U.S. Senate, 2004).
Today, the tax burden of the District is borne by middle class residents. Residents with
incomes of $20,000 to $60, 000 pay 1/10th in property tax, sales, and income taxes in the District
(Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, 2009). In the District, the local income and property
taxes are considered a deductible on the federal tax return (DC Fiscal Policy Institute, 2009).
This reduces the net tax, and shortens the reach of the state and local taxes.

Budgeting Matters in the District
In the practice of public budgeting many states have contingency funds that are set aside
for unforeseen events. In 2000, the United States Congress adopted legislation that required the
District to establish an “emergency reserve” of 2 percent of the budget and a “contingency
reserve” of 4 percent (Lazere, 2010). In comparison to most state and local budgets where the
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contingency fund is 1 to 3 percent of the total budget, the District of Columbia is required to set
aside a total of 6 percent of its local revenues (Lee, Johnson, and Joyce, 2004; Lazere, 2010).
However, the rules governing the District’s contingency and emergency reserves are more
restricted than any state contingency fund. In using any funds from these reserves, the District is
required to “replenish any withdrawals within a year and complete repayment within two years”
(Lazere, 2010, 1). The repayment aspect of the rule can be burdensome on the economic
management in the event that an economic upturn is not immediate.

District of Columbia and the Second Amendment
The Second Amendment—the right to keep and bear arms—is generally interpreted as a
collective right for states to organize and control militias (Jost, 2007). Due to the increasing
number of murders from firearms, the District of Columbia’s Firearms Control Regulations Act
of 1975 placed a restriction on residents’ right to own handguns. The firearms law required
“shotguns and rifles to be kept unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock”
(Anonymous, 2008; Jost 1996). In the case, United States v. Heller, the Supreme Court ruled
against the District’s gun law, deeming it unconstitutional (Anonymous, 2008). Although the
contrary symbolized a victory for supporters of the Second Amendment, for the District, it
became another example of the infringement of home rule, and local legislation that is necessary
to deal with issues relevant to local constituents.

Brasília, the Federal District of Brazil
During the mid 18th century, Brazil had two capitals based on the coastal
region. Salvador was the military capital and Rio de Janeiro was the capital of Brazil (Evenson,

22

1973). Prior to the establishment of Brasília, Brazil attempted to move its capital away from the
costal region twice. It was not until 1823 that Jose Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva presented a
proposal to the Assembly to relocate the capital of Brazil away from the coast. The proposal was
supported by the idea of solidifying the new image of the nation (Holston, 1989). Then in 1833,
Father Don Bosco from Turnin, Italy, received a paranormal apparition of a new city emerging in
the center of Brazil. The location of his visions was between the parallels of 15 degrees and 20
degrees,

which

is

the

exact

location

of

Brasília

today

(Holston,

1889).

After a series of commissions and constitutional changes, in 1956, and surveying of the land over
eight years, construction of the new Capital began. The selected location of the Federal District
was located in 2,245 square miles of a sparsely inhabited plateau from the State of Goias. On
April 21, 1960, Brasília was officially inaugurated and it started functioning as the new capital of
Brazil (Skidmore, 2010, 143). Lucio Costa drafted the plan for the city while deigns of the
buildings were done by Oscar Niemeyer (Skidmore, 2010, 143).
The Brazilian Federal District is very peculiar because the District consists of an
autonomous territory that is divided into administrative regions. However, Brasília, the federal
capital, and the seat of the government have full administrative authority. The other satellite
towns, Planaltina, Hyderabad, Sobradinho, Range, Paranoá Brazlândia, Guara, Cruise, Fern,
Santa Maria, São Sebastião, Corner of Emas, Riacho Fundo, South Lake, North Lake,
Candangolândia, and Bandeirante, all retain some administrative autonomy, but their economic
and social viability is dependent on Brasília.
The Federal Republic of Brazil is a democratic state with a presidential system of
government. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil of 1988 established three
government tiers: the Federal Union, 26 states and the Federal District of Brasília (which has the
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powers of both a state and a municipality), and 5,507 municipalities (Kee, 2003, 15). A major
purpose of the 1988 constitution was to decentralize tax revenue to provide greater tax resources
to subnational governments (Kee, 2003). The president of the republic performs two functions:
Head of State and Head of the Federal Government. In accordance with the 1988 national
constitution, the federal government acts decisively in the life of the Brazilian people by
establishing rules, implementing programs, or rendering services to the population. Brazil’s
current constitution places the following limitations on the national government:
The Republic may not intervene in the States or in the Federal District, except to:
maintain national integrity; fight back a foreign invasion or invasion of one unit of the
Federation in another; put an end to a serious jeopardy to public order; guarantee the free
exercise of any of the Branches in the units of the Federation; reorganize the finances of a
unit of the Federation which: a) suspends payment of a consolidated debt for more than
two consecutive years, except in the event of force majeure; b) fails to deliver to the
Municipalities tax revenues established in this Constitution, within the periods of time
established by law; provide for the enforcement of a federal law, court order, or decision;
ensure compliance with the following constitutional principles: a) republican form,
representative system, and democratic regime; b) the rights of the individual; c)
municipal autonomy; d) rendering of accounts of the direct and indirect government
administration (Government of Brazil, 1988).
Therefore, the new constitution gave the District full autonomy, representation in the lower and
upper houses of the national Congress, and the rights to elect a governor and legislators. Fiscal
decentralization is another benefit that came with the new constitution. States and municipalities
gained income from the national government, without a transfer of accountability (Luna and
Klein, 2006, 28).
The legislative chamber of the Federal District was created after an intense struggle for
political autonomy of the District. Although the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 granted
autonomy to the Federal District, for 26 years, the residents could not elect their local
representatives. It was not until 1986 that the right for political autonomy was exercised with the
election of the first deputies and senators to represent the city in Congress.

24

The Organic Law of the Federal District explicitly details the legislative powers of
Brasília. Article 2 of the Organic Law identifies the Federal District as an indissoluble part of the
Federal Republic of Brazil. This Article also espouses the core values that symbolize the
preservation of autonomy as a federal unit, full citizenship, the dignity of the human person,
social values of work and free enterprise, and political pluralism (Brasília, 2009). In Article 15,
an explanation of the duties of the Federal District is fully listed and can be viewed in Appendix
A (Articles 23 and 24) as well as Appendix B (Articles 14-17). The powers range from
legislative authority in matters of social to economic development.

Brasília Current Situations
During its fifty-year evolution, Brasilia has not been safeguarded from the issues that are
correlated with metropolitan sprawl and overpopulation. However, endowed with local
autonomy, the Federal District of Brazil has ameliorated and assisted some of its local problems
attributable to the level of local autonomy granted by the national constitution. Decisions made
at the local level are mostly done without the intrusion or intervention of the national
government. Brasília has been able to deal with housing, education, and political problems in a
manner that is favorable to and supported by its local constituents.

Home Ownership in Brasília
In Brazil, much of the land is owned by the wealthy. These wealthy landowners in Brazil
exude the historical convention that owning large tracts of land equates to prestige. Many of
these landowners often times are unaware of the property. During the development of the new
capital, the government did not complete the purchase of reserved land that surrounded the
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Federal District. As Brasília began to grow, the land surrounding the Federal District began to
increase in value. Also, the property became a heightened interest to residents that worked in
Brasília and were unable to afford houses directly within Brasilia.
Development in these surrounding areas has increased over time. Moreover, land
grabbers began doctoring deeds to sell land that they did not own. Many resident purchased the
properties and currently live on the land in homes they have worked hard to build and maintain.
Recently, the government discovered that a developer selling the properties did not have rights to
ownership. However, because of its sovereignty, the government of the Federal District was able
to intervene in the matter by filing a case on behalf of the resident that may have their land
expropriated by the bona fined owners. Also, the governor of the Federal District, Jose Roberto
Arruda, created a government department that will deal with this particular issue by legalizing
350 tracts of land for approximately 50,000 people (Kugel, 2009).

Government Corruption in Federal District’s Government
It is widely known and touted by Brazilians that there exists the lack of respect for the
law. Brazilians have long held contempt against the law and many political leaders have held this
perspective over the course of time (Skidmore, 2010). Therefore, corruption involving political
officials and civil service employees are more often praised rather than abhorred. The most
current political happening in the Federal District is the arrest of the Governor of Brasilia on
accusations of corruption. The accusations include bribery, obstruction of justice, and tampering
with evidence (Gusmão, 2010). Once the Governor was detained, the Vice-Governor and
president of the Legislative Assembly—both successors for the absence of the Governor—
resigned (Gusmão, 2010).
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Nonetheless, in the midst of political turmoil, the federal government remained at bay.
The national government allowed the legislature to amend the Organic Law so that an emergency
election could proceed to fill the void in leadership (Câmara Legislativa do Distrito Federal,
2010).

Brasília’s Economic Growth
In 2000, many changes in the Federal District’s economy occurred. The most notable
change was the enactment of an exemption on property tax and urban property tax. This
exemption led to an increase in investments to the construction sector that yielded 1 billion
raies—approximately 56 million U.S. dollars—in 1999. The construction sector in the Federal
District represents 6.9 percent of GDP for the district (Câmara Legislativa do Distrito Federal,
2010). The exemption from property tax and the flourishing construction sector has attracted new
businesses in information technology. Today, there is a very visual superseding growth in the
emergence of private sector companies in the midst of the home of the federal government.

Brasília’s Social and Demographic Development
The per capita income of the Federal District is more than twice the national average
(Câmara Legislativa do Distrito Federal, 2010). The District has an abundance of favelas, better
know in the U.S. as slums. However, the poor in these areas provide cheap labor that has helped
economic growth in the District. Albeit, there is a gap between the elite and the poor, the social
inequality is more balanced than the national average (Câmara Legislativa do Distrito Federal,
2010). The population density is the highest in all of Brazil at 410.9 inhabitants per kilometers
squared.
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Brasília’s Education Policy
The Federal District has the highest education rate in the entire county. The literacy rate
is 95.8 percent (Câmara Legislativa do Distrito Federal, 2010). Student enrolment in public
schools has grown by 33.4 percent from 1992 to 2006 (Câmara Legislativa do Distrito Federal,
2010). It is believed that the increase in school enrollment is the direct result of Governor
Cristovam Buarque’s Scholarship Program. The Scholarship Program is one percent of the
budget that pays a monthly salary to poor families that keep children in school.

Methodology
The purpose of this case study is to compare the governance structure of each federal
district as it relates to home rule. An empirical inquiry of policy documents for the District of
Columbia and Brasília were assessed for degrees of decentralization based on administrative,
legislative, and financial decentralization, in addition to constitutional limitations. The study
proposes a model that explains the vertical intergovernmental relations between the United States
Congress and the District of Columbia.
The study answers the following questions in order to create the model: (1) What is the
relationship between Congress and the Washington D.C. government? (2) How is the
relationship between the District of Columbia and Congress different from that of Brasília and
Brazil’s national government? Answers to these questions were formulated by liking historical
and policy information to the following areas: (1) Legislative Decentralization—The extent to
which constitutionally assigned powers are actually fully or only partially exercised by the
governments to which they are assigned. The degrees of autonomy that the subnational
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government may exercise legislative decisions and the extent to which concurrent or shared
responsibilities set out in the constitution are completed. (2) Administrative Decentralization:
The allocation of administrative responsibilities assigned by the constitution through delegation
or intergovernmental agreements. The extent to which the subnational government is dependent
on the national level for implementation of local policies. The extent to which the national
government has legislative responsibilities may give direction to the subnational government in
the administration of legislation. Whether legislative decisions on administrative changes are
made at the closest possible level to the population involved. (3) Financial Decentralization: The
extent to which decisions regarding taxes, the allocation of resources, and the flexibility of
investment are made by the subnational government. (4) Constitutional Limitations: Whether
there are constitutional prohibitions of certain activities on the subnational government by the
national constitution (Watts, 1996).
The above listed areas of analysis are facets used to express the level of autonomy and
the mobilizing role of both federal districts. The information collected in assessing these areas of
decentralization is organized into its respective category in order to explain the intent of the
policy and its effect on governance. As a means to answer the main questions by the identified
subcategories, a broad variety of literature was reviewed such as books journal articles, archival
information, the United States Constitution, the District of Columbia Home Rule Act of 1973
(amended through July 15, 2008), the 1988 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil, and
the Organic Law of the Federal District, Brasília, to name a few. Multiple sources were used to
provide triangulation of the phenomenon, and improve the reliability and validity of the study.
The investigation is done within the realm of practicality, eschewing speculative and
valuative discourse; therefore, objectivity lies within reach (Hawkesworht, 1988, 3). The analysis
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places emphasis on legislative, administrative, and financial decentralization, in addition to,
constitutional limitations. The author’s subjectivity was minimized due to the utilization of realworld news reports that are used to support or refute claims, a method that increases construct
validity (Yin, 2003). The cumulative assessment considers everything that goes toward
increasing the importance of the subnational government’s role as decentralization, and therefore
increases autonomy. Whereas, everything that goes toward decreasing the subnational
government’s role as centralization, leading to a decrease in autonomy. Constitutional limitations
on the subnational government were considered to have precedence even if the subnational
charter/law stated otherwise.

Discussion
In comparing both federal districts, it is clear that the national constitution of each
federation distributes powers and autonomy in different ways. The Brazilian constitution
specifically notes the powers afforded to each tier of government: national, state, and municipal.
Whereas, the United States Constitution only identifies the powers of the national government,
leaving the residual powers to the states. In addition, the widely accepted rule in the United
States is that local/municipal governments are creatures of the states; therefore, they receive their
autonomous powers from their respective state constitution (Wright, 2007). The commonalities
of autonomous local/municipal governments in the United States are the abilities to tax and
freely use own source revenues as well as the ability to annex property (Shock, 2010). However,
for the Washington District of Columbia, the United States Constitution specifically identifies
that the United States Congress has total jurisdiction of that area.
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In analyzing the Brazilian constitution, it is clear that Brasília is recognized to have the
powers of a state and has more constitutional privileges than the District of Columbia. By
removing the congressional privilege over the District of Columbia, in the Home Rule Act, the
District of Columbia will have responsibilities that are comparable to that of Brasília. However,
the District of Columbia is not allowed to make governing decisions solitary of Congress.
Inspecting the governing documents of both districts, the Organic Rule of Brasília was drafted by
its local constituents based on the national constitution; whereas, the District of Columbia Home
Rule Act was drafted by the Council of the District of Columbia and approved by Congress. The
Home Rule Act does not give the District any autonomy because Congress relinquishes
responsibilities and not legislative power to the District that is clearly stated within the document
and has been exercised throughout time (see Appendix B, HRA § 102).
Before delving into further comparative analyses, it is important to set forth what many
would consider the most powerful ways to constrain a government, by fiscal and legislative
restrictions. These two factors are pertinent mechanisms to achieve an effective, efficient,
equitable, and ethical government that is responsive to its constituents. Both factors—fiscal and
legislative autonomy—must be present in substantial amounts to assure governing success.
Despite its shortcomings, it is evident that Brasília has been able to evolve into a federal district
capable of responding to the needs of its constituents. And, the contributors to this successful
evolution are the availability of autonomy for legislating local matters and freedom in the use of
fiscal resources—apparent in Brasilia’s dealings with housing and education issues.
While, the District of Columbia has been given the responsibility to legislate over local
matters (see Appendix B, HRA § 302), Congress has to approve all legislation made by the D.C.
Council along with its budgetary apportionments. This subjectivity affords the U.S. Congress the
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opportunity to use the District of Columbia as its bargaining piece in order to achieve support of
national legislation or for congressional representatives to espouse the values of their
constituents on the residents of the District of Columbia.
The Home Rule Act clearly preserves congressional authority over the District (as shown
in Appendix B, HRA § 102). This stipulation has an explicit effect on governance within the
District because the decisions of the District, especially local decisions, are not exclusively made
by local constituents, but by congressional representatives with alternative agendas. The opposite
of this premise is the case in Brasília; local elected representatives make decisions without any
interference from the national government, as seen in the recent corruption case. Therefore, when
it comes to the enactment of legislation, the District of Columbia is highly dependent on the
approval of Congress, which does not occur in Brasília.
In assessing administrative decentralization, many of the responsibilities for providing
public services are laid upon the District of Columbia government. The devolution of financial
and managerial responsibilities is transferred from Congress to the District of Columbia. The
Home Rule Act unambiguously states that the purpose of the Act is to, “delegate certain
legislative powers” to the District of Columbia (Home Rule Act, 1978, 1). Therefore, within the
Home Rule Act, a charter was established. This type of devolution is common amongst local
governments throughout the United States. Local governments are commonly delegated the
administrative responsibilities to provide public safety, parks and recreation, waste water
treatment, trash removal, zoning, maintenance of city streets, fire and rescue services, animal
control, public transportation, housing assistance, public hospitals, social welfare programs, and
public utilities, to name a few.
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Furthermore, the District of Columbia has administrative authority over all services
typical of a local government in addition to services that are usually rendered by a state. Brasília
has comparable authority over the administrative responsibilities like as does the District of
Columbia. Therefore, in the aspect of administrative decentralization both federal districts have
the same degree of administrative decentralization. However, for the implementation of polices
concerning administrative matters, the District of Columbia has to seek approval from Congress.
In assessing financial decentralization, the District of Columbia has a variety of rules to
follow. In the Home Rule Act, the District receives a series of guidelines for borrowing,
expending, and generating revenues. The provision of the Home Rule Act consists of guidelines
concerning the management of fiscal resources. However, the most intrusive of all requirements
is the fact that the District’s budget has to be approved by an Act of Congress (see Appendix B,
HRA § 446). These checks and balances are not a part of Brasília’s governance. The national
government of Brazil does not intervene in the financial management of Brasília. It is instructive
to note here that the national constitution of Brazil does identify the tax base of the Federal
District and sets limitations on the power to tax. The Federal District is forbidden from
establishing a tax on goods and services, impose a tax without a law to establish it, and unequally
tax people of equal status, to name a few. Although the national government has placed tax
limitations on the Federal District, Brasília is left with sole governance over the expenditure and
management of its revenues. Therefore, Brasília has more authority over the management of its
own source revenues than the District of Columbia.
Congress places many constitutional limitations on the District of Columbia (as shown in
Appendix B, Title VI). These limitations impose a resonance of apprehension on the District’s
government. However, the limitations apply to borrowing, spending, as well as the reach of the
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District Council. While, the constitutional limitations of Brasilia are not as restrictive as the
District of Columbia; as expected, there are national government functions such as immigration,
currency, and postal services, to name a few, which are the sole responsibility of the federal
government as presented in Appendix A (Article 22) and Appendix C (Article 17).
Overall, decentralization is close to being nonexistent in the District of Columbia. The
transfer of duties from Congress to the District appears to show the distribution of powers,
however, there are stipulations and contingencies that are attached. The District of Columbia
receives tasks with little power to make pertinent decisions; therefore, the subnational
government is at the will of the national government. Table 1 is a synopsis of the
decentralization in both federal districts.

Table 1. The Distribution of Powers and Functions
Legislative

Administrative

Fiscal

Constitutional Limitations

Washington D.C.

N/FD

D

N/FD

N

Brasília

FD

FD

FD

N/FD

N = National government power
FD = Federal district power

Washington D.C. Model of Intergovernmental Relations
From the review of the intergovernmental relationship of the District of Columbia and the
federal government, it is clear that this relationship is a dominant authority model. In the
dominant-authoritative model, Congress can grant the District more authority without
relinquishing any of its own powers. In Figure 1, the outer circle represents Congress and the
inner circle is the District of Columbia. The U.S. Congress retains all of its powers; therefore, the
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outer circle remains the same. The outer circle can transfer autonomy to the inner circle without
changing size constitutionally because Congress has sole authority. However, depending on the
will of Congress the inner circle can expand and restrict. This means that the District government
can never be a sole authority over governance in the District unless a constitutional amendment
is passed. As a result, the powers of the Congress are of positive infinity whereas the powers of
the District are finite approaching negative infinity.

Figure 1. Model of Intergovernmental Relations between the District of Columbia and Congress

The most prominent misconception of the District of Columbia is that the problems of the
District can be reconciled with adequate funds. However, in studies dealing with the alleviation
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of urban problems, it is proven that “even if sufficient funds were available over time, solutions
to urban problems would remain because of the lack of political and governmental institutions
that can undertake comprehensive action” (Leach 1976, 4). Also, a poorly constructed
intergovernmental fiscal system can lead to many of the fiscal issues of the District (Leach,
1976). Therefore, the District needs autonomy in implementing legislation that will effectively
address those problems specific to its constituents.
The urban fiscal problem is the plight of central cities, and the nature of fiscal problems
consist of two closely interrelated components: some roots lie in the mismatch of required
services and available revenue at the local level, while others lie in the poorly constructed
intergovernmental fiscal system (Leach, 1976). It is recommended that Congress design a
Control Board on home rule for the District of Columbia that balances fidelity to American
democratic principles with the need for effective management and fiscal health of the city that
hosts the federal government (Democracy or Distrust, 1998, 2062).
Home rule for a subnational government can be severely limited or not granted at all;
however, many national and state governments elected to endow subordinate-level governments
with home rule (Democracy or Distrust, 1998). In analyzing home rule and the extent to which a
local government should be allowed to govern, it was found that:
…the supervisory role that states or central governments play should not be perceived
from the superior-subordinate relationship in which the states or central or regional
government would unilaterally dictate how the local governments should be run; and,
thereby, leaving little or no room for the local governments to exercise some discretion in
deciding on some critical issues that affect the people (Aluko, 2005, 207).
Therefore, the models of intergovernmental relationship that would work best for the District
would be similar to the federal-state relationship of the coordinate-authority model as shown in
Figure 2. It provides clear boundaries between the authority of the subnational and national
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jurisdiction, and shows a seamless intergovernmental connection where the District of Columbia
is.

Although it is clear that the District of Columbia is a creature of the U.S. Congress, the

present relationship, as shown in Figure 1, does not work to the benefit of the District’s citizens
to effect home rule.

Figure 2. Proposed Model of the Intergovernmental Relations between the Congress and the
District of Columbia.

Governance in the Washington District of Columbia is contrary to the conservative
perspective of federalism that “opposes central planning, distrusts concentrated power, espouses
cynicism about the human ability to govern, and abhors unchecked popular will” (Hendrickson,
2004, 2). The true intention of federalism is not present in the Washington District of Columbia.
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An alternative to the major caveats in the District of Columbia Home Rule Act of 1973 may be
the allocation of fewer responsibilities. Doing this will bestow greater freedom and autonomy to
the District.
As social issues rise—poverty, unemployment, unaffordable housing—in the District, the
government is faced with having to deal with a host of issues that require legislative action.
Nonetheless, local government will be subject to the ideals of Congress. It is important to note
that this study approaches the comparison from a scientific objective and not from a legal
perspective. Also, the author notes that there is no single quantifiable index to adequately
measure the scope of decentralization and the degree of autonomy within a political system;
therefore, individual perspectives can alter the degree of each comparison. This assessment is
external and does not consider the norms of each society.
Compared to Brasilia, the District of Columbia does not have a strong government
because it receives direction on many matters from Congress, and retains very little home rule
powers. Some commonly proposed solutions for the District are to: (1) seek statehood, however,
this idea is not possible without a constitutional amendment, and is very unpopular to
congressional members; (2) seek full voting representation in Congress; (3) retrocede the District
back to the state of Maryland, an idea that also requires congressional support and approval from
the state of Maryland; and (4) allow city residents to vote in Maryland for their representatives to
the Senate and House (Cityhood for D.C. 2010; Dodd, 2004). Many scholars have contended on
the possible preservation of federalism (e.g., Scheiber 1980); however, they agree “that sharing
is not evidence of decentralization or diffusion of power” (Scheiber, 1980, 672). Since there is no
true separation of powers between the District of Columbia and Congress, federalism is not
exercised. This void subjects the residents of the District to disenfranchisement while the citizens
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of the Untied States are either ignorant or apathetic to the governance problem in the District of
Columbia.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Referenced parts of Brazil’s National Constitution:
TITLE III. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE
Article 21. The Union shall have the power to:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.

ix.
x.
xi.

xii.

xiii.
xiv.

xv.
xvi.
xvii.

maintain relations with foreign states and participate in international organizations;
declare war and make peace;
ensure national defense;
allow foreign forces, in the cases provided for in a supplementary law, to pass through the
national territory or to remain therein temporarily;
declare a state of siege, a state of defense and federal intervention;
authorize and control the production and trade of military materiel;
issue currency;
manage the foreign exchange reserves of the country and control financial operations,
especially those of credit, exchange and capitalization, as well as insurance and private
security;
prepare and carry out national and regional plans for the ordaining of the territory and for
economic and social development;
maintain the postal service and the national air mail;
operate, directly or through authorization, concession or permission, the telecommunications
services, as set forth by law, which law shall provide for the organization of the services,
the establishment of a regulatory agency and other institutional issues;
operate, directly or through authorization, concession or permission:
a. the services of sound broadcasting and of sound and image broadcasting;
b. the electric power services and facilities and the energetic exploitation of
watercourses, jointly with the states wherein those hydro-energetic potentials are
located;
c. air and aerospace navigation and airport infrastructure;
d. railway and waterway services between seaports and national borders or which cross
e. the boundary of a state or territory:
f. interstate and international highway passenger transportation services;
g. sea, river and lake ports;
organize and maintain the Judicial Power, the Public Prosecution and the Public Legal Defense
of the Federal District and territories;
organize and maintain the federal police, the federal highway and railway polices as well as
the civil police, the military police, the military fire brigade of the Federal District and
territories;
organize and maintain the official services of statistics, geography, geology and cartography of
national scope;
classify, for indicative purposes, public entertainment and television programs;
grant amnesty;
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xviii. plan and promote permanent defense against public disasters especially droughts and floods;
xix. establish a national system for the management of hydric resources and define criteria for the
concession of the right to their use;
xx. establish directives for urban development, including housing, basic sanitation and urban
transportation;
xxi. establish principles and directives for the national transportation system;
xxii. perform the services of maritime, air, and border police;
xxiii. operate nuclear energy services and facilities of any nature, exercise state monopoly over
research, mining, enrichment and reprocessing, industrialization and trade in nuclear ores
and their by-products, taking into account the following principles and conditions:
a. all nuclear activity within the national territory shall only be admitted for peaceful
purposes and subject to approval by the National Congress;
b. under a concession or permission, authorization is given for the of radioisotopes in
research and for medical, agricultural and industrial use as well as for other analogous
activities;
c. civil liability for nuclear damages does not depend on the existence of fault;
xxiv. organize, maintain and carry out inspection of working conditions;
xxv. establish the areas and conditions for the exercise of placer mining activities in associative
form.
Article 22. The Union has the exclusive power to legislate on:
i. civil, commercial, criminal, procedural, electoral, agrarian, maritime, aeronautical, space and
labour law;
ii. expropriation;
iii. civil and military requisitioning, in case of imminent danger or in times of war;
iv. waters, energy, informatics, telecommunications and radio broadcasting;
v. the postal service;
vi. the monetary and measures systems, metal certificates and guarantees;
vii. policies for credit, foreign exchange, insurance and transfer of values;
viii. foreign and interstate trade;
ix. guidelines for the national transportation policy;
x. the regime of the ports and lake, river, ocean, air and aerospace navigation;
xi. traffic and transportation;
xii. beds of ore, mines, other mineral resources and metallurgy;
xiii. nationality, citizenship and naturalization;
xiv. Indian populations;
xv. emigration, immigration, entry, extradition and expulsion of foreigners;
xvi. the organization of the national employment system and conditions for the practice of
professions;
xvii. the judicial organization of the Public Prosecution and of the Public Legal Defense of the
Federal District and of the territories, as well as their administrative organization;
xviii. the national statistical, cartographic and geological systems;
xix. systems of savings, as well as of obtaining and guaranteeing popular savings;
xx. consortium and lottery systems;
xxi. general organization rules, troops, material guarantees, drafting and mobilization of the
military police and military fire brigades;
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xxii.
xxiii.
xxiv.
xxv.
xxvi.
xxvii.

the jurisdiction of the federal police and of the federal highway- and military polices:
social security;
directives and bases of the national education;
public registers;
nuclear activities of any nature;
general rules for all types of bidding and contracting, for the direct and indirect public
administration, including foundations instituted and maintained by the Government, in its
various spheres, and companies under government control;
xxviii. territorial defense, aerospace defense, maritime defense, civil defense, and national
mobilization;
commercial advertising.
Article 23. The Union, the states, the Federal District and the municipalities, in common, have
the power:
xxvi. to ensure that the Constitution, the laws and the democratic institutions are respected and that
public property is preserved;
xxvii. to provide for health and public assistance, for the protection and safeguard of handicapped
persons;
xxviii. to protect the documents, works and other assets of historical, artistic or cultural value, the
monuments, the remarkable landscapes and the archaeological sites;
xxix. to prevent works of art and other assets of historical, artistic and cultural value from being
taken out of the country, destroyed or from being deprived of their original
characteristics;
xxx. to provide the means of access to culture, education and science;
xxxi. to protect the environment and to fight pollution in any of its forms;
xxxii. to preserve the forests, fauna and flora;
xxxiii. to promote agriculture and cattle breeding and organize the supply of foodstuff;
xxxiv. to promote housing construction programs and the improvement of housing and basic
sanitation conditions;
xxxv. to fight the causes of poverty and the factors leading to substandard living conditions,
promoting the social integration of the unprivileged sectors of the population;
xxxvi. to register, monitor and control the concessions of rights to research and exploit hydric and
mineral resources within their territories;
xxxvii. lo establish and to implement an educational policy for traffic safety.
Sole paragraph - A supplementary law shall establish rules for the cooperation between the
Union and the states, the Federal District and the municipalities aiming at the attainment of
balanced development and well- being on a nationwide scope.
Article 24. The Union, the states and the Federal District have the power to legislate
concurrently on:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

tax, financial, penitentiary, economic and urbanistic law;
budget;
trade boards
costs of forensic services;
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v. production and consumption;
vi. forests, hunting, fishing, fauna, preservation of nature, defense of the soil and natural
resources, protection of the environment and control of pollution;
vii. protection of the historic, cultural and artistic heritage, as well as of assets of touristic interest
and landscapes of outstanding beauty;
viii. liability for damages to the environment, to consumers, to assets and rights of artistic,
aesthetic, historical, and touristic value, as well as to remarkable landscapes;
ix. education, culture, teaching and sports;
x. establishment, operation and procedures of small claims courts;
xi. judicial procedures;
xii. social security, protection and defense of health;
xiii. legal assistance and public defense;
xiv. protection and social integration of handicapped persons;
xv. protection of childhood and youth;
xvi. organization, guarantees, rights and duties of the civil policies.
xvii. Paragraph 1 - Within the scope of concurrent legislation, the competence of the Union shall be
limited to the establishment of general rules.
xviii. Paragraph 2 - The competence of the Union to legislate upon general rules does not exclude
the supplementary competence of the states
xix. Paragraph 3 - If there is no federal law or general rules, the states shall exercise full legislative
competence to provide for their peculiarities.
xx. Paragraph 4 - The supervenience of a federal law over general rules suspends the effectiveness
of a state law to the extent that the two are contrary
CHAPTER V - THE FEDERAL DISTRICT AND THE TERRITORIES
SECTION I - THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
Article 32. The Federal District, which may not be divided into municipalities shall be governed
by an organic law, voted in two readings, with a minimum interval of ten days, and approved by
two-thirds of the Legislative Chamber, which shall enact it, in accordance with the principles set
forth in this Constitution.
Paragraph l - The legislative powers reserved to the states and municipalities are attributed to the
Federal District.
Paragraph 2 - The election of the Governor and the Vice-Governor, complying with the rules of
article 77, and of the District Deputies shall coincide with that of the state Governors and
Deputies, for a term of office of the same…
Paragraph 3 - The provisions of article 27 apply to the District Deputies and the Legislative
Chamber.
Paragraph 4 - A federal law shall provide for the use, by the Government of the Federal District,
of the civil and military polices and the military fire brigade.
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Appendix B
Referenced parts of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act of 1973
TITLE I
STATEMENT OF PURPOSES
SEC. 102. [D.C. Official Code § 1-201.02] (a) Subject to the retention by Congress of the
ultimate legislative authority over the nation's capital granted by article I, § 8, of the
Constitution, the intent of Congress is to delegate certain legislative powers to the government of
the District of Columbia; authorize the election of certain local officials by the registered
qualified electors in the District of Columbia; grant to the inhabitants of the District of Columbia
powers of local self-government; modernize, reorganize, and otherwise improve the
governmental structure of the District of Columbia; and, to the greatest extent possible,
consistent with the constitutional mandate, relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon
essentially local District matters.
(b) Congress further intends to implement certain recommendations of the Commission on the
Organization of the Government of the District of Columbia and take certain other actions
irrespective of whether the charter for greater self-government provided for in title IV of this Act
[District Charter] is accepted or rejected by the registered qualified electors of the District of
Columbia.
TITLE II
LEGISLATIVE POWER
SEC. 302. [D.C. Official Code § 1-203.02] Except as provided in sections 601, 602, and
603 [D.C. Official Code §§ 1-206.01, 1-206.02, and 1-206.03], the legislative power of the
District shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within the District consistent with the
Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this Act subject to all the restrictions and
limitations imposed upon the States by the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of
the United States.
TITLE IV
PART C -- THE JUDICIARY
JUDICIAL POWERS
SEC. 431. [D.C. Official Code § § 1-204.31] (a) The judicial power of the District is vested in
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
The Superior Court has jurisdiction of any civil action or other matter (at law or in equity)
brought in the District and of any criminal case under any law applicable exclusively to the
District. The Superior Court has no jurisdiction over any civil or criminal matter over which a
United States court has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to an Act of Congress. The Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction of appeals from the Superior Court and, to the extent provided by law,
to review orders and decisions of the Mayor, the Council, or any agency of the District. The
District of Columbia courts shall also have jurisdiction over any other matters granted to the
District of Columbia courts by other provisions of law…
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ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS BY CONGRESS
SEC. 446. [D.C. Official Code § 1-204.46] The Council, within 56 calendar days after receipt of
the budget proposal from the Mayor, and after public hearing, shall by act adopt the annual
budget for the District of Columbia government. Any supplements thereto shall also be adopted
by act by the Council after public hearing. Such budget so adopted shall be submitted by the
Mayor to the President for transmission by him to the Congress. Except as provided in section
445A(b), section 467(d), section 471(c), section 472(d)(2), section 475(e)(2), section 483(d), and
section 490(f), (g), (h)(3), and (i)(3), [D.C. Official Code §§ § 1-204.45a(b), § 1-204.67(d), § 1204.71(c), § 1-204.72(d)(2), § 1-204.75(e)(2), § 1-204.83(d), and subsections (f), (g), (h)(3), and
(i)(3) of § § 1-204.90] no amount may be obligated or expended by any officer or employee of
the District of Columbia government unless such amount has been approved by Act of Congress,
and then only according to such Act. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Mayor
shall not transmit any annual budget or amendments or supplements thereto, to the President of
the United States until the completion of the budget procedures contained in this Act. After the
adoption of the annual budget for a fiscal year (beginning with the annual budget for fiscal year
1995), no reprogramming of amounts in the budget may occur unless the Mayor submits to the
Council a request for such reprogramming and the Council approves the request, but only if any
additional expenditures provided under such request for an activity are offset by reductions in
expenditures for another activity.
CONSISTENCY OF BUDGET, ACCOUNTING, AND PERSONNEL SYSTEMS
SEC. 447. [D.C. Official Code § 1-204.47] The Mayor shall implement appropriate procedures
to insure that budget, accounting, and personnel control systems and structures are synchronized
for budgeting and control purposes on a continuing basis. No employee shall be hired on a fulltime or part-time basis unless such position is authorized by act of Congress. Employees shall be
assigned in accordance with the program, organization, and fund categories specified in the act
of Congress authorizing such position. Hiring of temporary employees and temporary employee
transfers among programs shall be consistent with applicable acts of Congress and
reprogramming procedures to insure that costs are accurately associated with programs and
sources of funding.
Subpart 2 -- Audit
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AUDITOR
SEC. 455. [D.C. Official Code § 1-204.55] (a) There is established for the District of Columbia
the Office of District of Columbia Auditor who shall be appointed by the Chairman, subject to
the approval of a majority of the Council. The District of Columbia Auditor shall serve for a term
of six years and shall be paid at a rate of compensation as may be established from time to time
by the Council…
(d) The District of Columbia Auditor shall submit his audit reports to the Congress, the Mayor,
and the Council. Such reports shall set forth the scope of the audits conducted by him and shall
include such comments and information as the District of Columbia Auditor may deem
necessary to keep the Congress, the Mayor, and the Council informed of the operations to which
the reports relate, together with such recommendations with respect thereto as he may deem
advisable…
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TITLE VI
RETENTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
SEC. 601. [D.C. Official Code § 1-206.01] Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Act, the Congress of the United States reserves the right, at any time, to exercise its
constitutional authority as legislature for the District, by enacting legislation for the District on
any subject, whether within or without the scope of legislative power granted to the Council by
this Act, including legislation to amend or repeal any law in force in the District prior to or after
enactment of this Act and any act passed by the Council.
LIMITATIONS ON THE COUNCIL
SEC. 602. [D.C. Official Code § 1-1-206.02] (a) The Council shall have no authority to pass any
act contrary to the provisions of this Act except as specifically provided in this Act, or to -(1) impose any tax on property of the United States or any of the several states;
(2) lend the public credit for support of any private undertaking;
(3) enact any act, or enact any act to amend or repeal any Act of Congress, which concerns the
functions or property of the United States or which is not restricted in its application exclusively
in or to the District;
(4) enact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provision of title 11 of the
District of Columbia [Official] Code (relating to organization and jurisdiction of the District of
Columbia courts);
(5) impose any tax on the whole or any portion of the personal income, either directly or at the
source thereof, of any individual not a resident of the District (the terms "individual" and
"resident" to be understood for the purposes of this paragraph as they are defined in section 4 of
title I of the District of Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1947[,approved July 16,
1947 (61 Stat. 332; D.C. Official Code § 47-1801.04)]);
(6) enact any act, resolution, or rule which permits the building of any structure within the
District of Columbia in excess of the height limitations contained in section 5 of the
Act of June 1, 1910 [An Act To regulate the height of buildings in the District of Columbia (36
Stat. 453)] (D.C. Code, sec. 5-405)[ D.C. Official Code § 6-601.05], and in effect on the date of
66 enactment of this Act [December 24, 1973];
(7) enact any act, resolution, or regulation with respect to the Commission on
Mental Health;
(8) enact any act or regulation relating to the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia or any other court of the United States in the District other than the \
District courts, or relating to the duties or powers of the United States Attorney or the United
States Marshal for the District of Columbia;
(9) enact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provision of title 23 of the
District of Columbia [Official] Code (relating to criminal procedure), or with respect to any
provision of any law codified in title 22 or 24 of the District of Columbia Code (relating to
crimes and treatment of prisoners), or with respect to any criminal offense pertaining to articles
subject to regulation under chapter 32 of title 22 during the forty-eight full calendar months
immediately following the day on which the members of the Council first elected pursuant to this
Act take office; or
(10) enact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to the District of Columbia
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Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority established under section 101(a)
of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995
[D.C. Official Code § 47-391.01(a)].
(b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as vesting in the District government any greater
authority over the National Zoological Park, the National Guard of the District of Columbia, the
Washington Aqueduct, the National Capital Planning Commission, or, except as otherwise
specifically provided in this Act, over any federal agency, than was vested in the Commissioner
[Mayor] prior to the effective date of title IV [District Charter] of this Act [January 2, 1975].
(c) (1) Except acts of the Council which are submitted to the President in accordance
with the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 [Chapter 11 of Title 31, United States Code], any act
which the Council determines, according to section 412(a) [D.C. Official Code § 1-204.12(a)],
should take effect immediately because of emergency circumstances, and acts proposing
amendments to title IV of this Act [District Charter] and except as provided in section 462(c) and
section 472(d)(1) [D.C. Official Code §§ 1-204.62(c) and § 1-204.72(d)(1)], the Chairman of the
Council shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President of the
Senate, a copy of each act passed by the Council and signed by the Mayor, or vetoed by the
Mayor and repassed by two-thirds of the Council present and voting, each act passed by the
Council and allowed to become effective by the Mayor without his signature, and each initiated
act and act subject to referendum which has been ratified by a majority of the registered qualified
electors voting on the initiative or referendum. Except as provided in paragraph (2) [of this
subsection,] such act shall take effect upon the expiration of the 30-calendar-day period
(excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and any day on which neither House is in session
because of an adjournment sine die, a recess of more than 3 days, or an adjournment of more
than three days) beginning on the day such act is transmitted by the Chairman to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, or upon the date prescribed by
such act, whichever is later, unless during such 30-day period, there has been enacted into law a
joint resolution disapproving such act. In any case in which any such joint resolution
disapproving such an act has, within such 30-day period, passed both Houses of Congress and
has been
67 transmitted to the President, such resolution, upon becoming law, subsequent to the expiration
of such 30-day period, shall be deemed to have repealed such act, as of the date such resolution
becomes law. The provisions of section 604 [D.C. Official Code § 1-206.04], except subsections
(d), (e), and (f) of such section, shall apply with respect to any joint resolution disapproving any
act pursuant to this paragraph.
(2) In the case of any such act transmitted by the Chairman with respect to any act codified in
title 22, 23, or 24 of the District of Columbia [Official] Code, such act shall take effect at the end
of the 60-day period beginning on the day such act is transmitted by the Chairman to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate unless, during such 60-day
period, there has been enacted into law a joint resolution disapproving such act. In any case in
which any such joint resolution disapproving such an act has, within such 60-day period, passed
both Houses of Congress and has been transmitted to the President, such resolution, upon
becoming law subsequent to the expiration of such 60-day period shall be deemed to have
repealed such act, as of the date such resolution becomes law. The provisions of section 604
[D.C. Official Code § 1-206.04], relating to an expedited procedure for consideration
of joint resolutions, shall apply to a joint resolution disapproving such act as specified in this
paragraph.
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(3) The Council shall submit with each Act transmitted under this subsection an estimate of the
costs which will be incurred by the District of Columbia as a result of the enactment of the Act in
each of the first 4 fiscal years for which the Act is in effect, together with a statement of the basis
for such estimate.
BUDGET PROCESS; LIMITATIONS ON BORROWING AND SPENDING
SEC. 603. [D.C. Official Code § 1-206.03] (a) Nothing in this act shall be construed as making
any change in existing law, regulation, or basic procedure and practice relating to the respective
roles of the Congress, the President, the federal Office of Management and Budget, and the
Comptroller General of the United States in the preparation, review, submission, examination,
authorization, and appropriation of the total budget of the District of Columbia government.
(b)(1) No general obligation bonds (other than bonds to refund outstanding indebtedness) or
Treasury capital project loans shall be issued during any fiscal year in an amount which would
cause the amount of principal and interest required to be paid both serially and into a sinking
fund in any fiscal year on the aggregate amounts of all outstanding general obligation bonds and
such Treasury loans, to exceed 17 percent of the District revenues (less any fees or revenues
directed to servicing revenue bonds, any revenues, charges, or fees dedicated for the purposes of
water and sewer facilities described in section 490(a) [D.C. Official Code § 1-204.90(a)]
(including fees or revenues directed to servicing or securing revenue bonds issued for such
purposes), retirement contributions, revenues from retirement systems, and revenues derived
from such Treasury loans and the sale of general obligation or revenue bonds) which the Mayor
estimates, and the District of Columbia Auditor certifies, will be credited to the District during
the fiscal year in which the bonds will be issued. Treasury capital project loans include all
borrowings from the United States Treasury, except those funds advanced to the District by the
Secretary of the Treasury under the provisions of title VI of the District of Columbia Revenue 68
Act of 1939 [, approved July 26, 1939 (P.L. 76-225; 53 Stat. 1118)]. (2) Obligations incurred
pursuant to the authority contained in the District of
Columbia Stadium Act of 1957[, approved September 7, 1957] (71 Stat. 619; D.C. Code, title 2,
chapter 17, subchapter II) [D.C. Official Code §§ 3-321 through 3-330], obligations incurred by
the agencies transferred or established by sections 201 [Amendments] and 202 [D.C. Official
Code § 1-202.02], whether incurred before or after such transfer or establishment, and
obligations incurred pursuant to general obligation bonds of the District of Columbia issued prior
to October 1, 1996, for the financing of Department of Public Works, Water and Sewer Utility
Administration capital projects, shall not be included in determining the aggregate amount of all
outstanding obligations subject to the limitation specified in the preceding paragraph.
(3) The 17 percent limitation specified in paragraph (1) [of this subsection] shall be calculated in
the following manner:
(A) Determine the dollar amount equivalent to 17 percent of the District revenues (less any fees
or revenues directed to servicing revenue bonds, any revenues, charges, or fees dedicated for the
purposes of water and sewer facilities described in section 490(a) [D.C.
Official Code § 1-204.90(a)] (including fees or revenues directed to servicing or securing
revenue bonds issued for such purposes), retirement contributions, revenues from retirement
systems, and revenues derived from such Treasury loans and the sale of general obligation or
revenue bonds) which the Mayor estimates, and the District of Columbia Auditor certifies, will
be credited to the District during the fiscal year for which the bonds will be issued;
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(B) Determine the actual total amount of principal and interest to be paid in each fiscal year for
all outstanding general obligation bonds (less the allocable portion of principal and interest to be
paid during the year on general obligation bonds of the District of
Columbia issued prior to October 1, 1996, for the financing of Department of Public Works,
Water and Sewer Utility Administration capital projects) and such Treasury loans;
(C) Determine the amount of principal and interest to be paid during each fiscal year over the
term of the proposed general obligation bond or such Treasury loan to be issued; and
(D) If in any one fiscal year the sum arrived at by adding subparagraphs
(B) and (C) [of this paragraph] exceeds the amount determined under subparagraph (A) [of this
paragraph], then the proposed general obligation bond or such Treasury loan in subparagraph (C)
[of this paragraph] cannot be issued.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (f) [of this section], the Council shall not approve any
budget which would result in expenditures being made by the District government, during any
fiscal year, in excess of all resources which the Mayor estimates will be available from all funds
available to the District for such fiscal year. The budget shall identify any tax increases which
shall be required in order to balance the budget as submitted. The Council shall be required to
adopt such tax increases to the extent its budget is approved.
(d) Except as provided in subsection (f) [of this section], the Mayor shall not forward to the
President for submission to Congress a budget which is not balanced according to the provision
of subsection 603(c) [(subsection (c) of this section) -- D.C. Official Code § 1206.03(c)].
(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting the applicability to the District government
of the provisions of section 3679 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (31 69 U.S.C.
1341), the so-called Anti-Deficiency Act [Subchapter II of Chapter 15 of Title 31, United States
Code].
(f) In the case of a fiscal year which is a control year (as defined in section 305(4) of the
District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995[,
approved April 17, 1995 (109 Stat. 152; D.C. [Official] Code § 47-393(4)])-(1) subsection (c) of this section and subsection (d) [of this section] shall not apply; and
(2) the Council may not approve, and the Mayor may not forward to the President, any budget
which is not consistent with the financial plan and budget established for the fiscal year under
subtitle A of title II of such Act [part B of subchapter VII of Chapter 3 of Title 47 of the D.C.
Official Code].
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON CERTAIN DISTRICT MATTERS
SEC. 604. [D.C. Official Code § 1-206.04] (a) This section is enacted by Congress -(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively, and as such these provisions are deemed a part of the rule of each
House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that
House in the case of resolutions described by this section; and they supersede other rules only to
the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rule (so far as
relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent
as in the case of any other rule of that House.
(b) For the purpose of this section, "resolution" means only a joint resolution, the matter after the
resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the . . . . . . . . . approves/disapproves of the action
of the District of Columbia Council described as follows: . . . . . . . . . .", the blank spaces therein
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being appropriately filled, and either approval or disapproval being appropriately indicated; but
does not include a resolution which specifies more than 1 action.
(c) A resolution with respect to Council action shall be referred to the Committee on the
District of Columbia of the House of Representatives, or the Committee on the District of
Columbia of the Senate, by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be.
(d) If the Committee to which a resolution has been referred has not reported it at the end
of 20 calendar days after its introduction, it is in order to move to discharge the Committee from
further consideration of any other resolution with respect to the same Council action which has
been referred to the Committee.
(e) A motion to discharge may be made only by an individual favoring the resolution, is highly
privileged (except that it may not be made after the Committee has reported a resolution with
respect to the same action), and debate thereon shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be
divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the
motion is not in order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion
is agreed to or disagreed to.
(f) If the motion to discharge is agreed to or disagreed to, the motion may not be renewed, nor
may another motion to discharge the Committee be made with respect to any other resolution
with respect to the same action.
(g) When the Committee has reported, or has been discharged from further consideration of, a
resolution, it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect
has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. The motion is
highly privileged and is not debatable. An amendment to the motion is not in order, and it is not
in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.
(h) Debate on the resolution shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided
equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. A motion further to limit
debate is not debatable. An amendment to, or motion to recommit, the resolution is not in order,
and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or
disagreed to.
(i) Motions to postpone made with respect to the discharge from Committee or the consideration
of a resolution, and motions to proceed to the consideration of other business, shall be decided
without debate.
(j) Appeals from the decisions of the chair relating to the application of the rules of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a
resolution shall be decided without debate.
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Appendix C
Referenced Parts of the Organic Law of the Federal District (Brasília)
CHAPTER III, Section I, Article 15
THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
Competency Private
Incumbent upon the Federal District:
I. to organize its government and administration;
II. create, organize, or terminate Administrative Regions, in accordance with applicable law;
III. to establish and collect taxes, subject to the cumulative power of the Federal District;
IV. establish, monitor and charge rates and public prices of its mission;
V. to provide for the administration, use, acquisition and disposal of public assets;
VI. organize and provide, directly or by concession or permission, the services of local interest,
including public transportation, which is of essential nature;
VII. keep with the technical and financial cooperation of the education programs, primarily
elementary and preschool;
VIII. celebrate and sign adjustments, joint ventures, partnerships, agreements and
administrative decisions with the Union, states and municipalities for enforcement of its laws
and services;
IX. Developing and implementing the annual plan, the budget guidelines and annual budget;
X. Developing and implementing the Master Plan of Land Management, the Law of Use and
Land Use and Local Development Plans to promote proper land use planning, integrated with
environmental values, through planning and controlling the use, subdivision and occupation
of urban land, (Item with the wording of the Amendment to the Organic Law No. 49 of
2007.) 2
XI. authorize, allow or permit and regulate, license and monitor services of vehicle rentals;
XII. to provide for the creation, transformation and extinction of offices, positions and
functions;
XIII. have on the organization of the framework for their servers, establishing career paths, the
direct administration, local public foundations and the Federal District; pay and single legal
regime of the servers;
XIV. exercising the powers of police administration;
XV. license an industrial, commercial, service and similar or revoke the license of the license
to become harmful to the environment, health and welfare of the population or that violate
legal provisions;
XVI. to regulate and enforce street trading, including paper and other recyclables;
XVII. propose a cleaning public places, removal and fate of household waste and other waste;
XVIII. to provide for funeral services and administration of cemeteries; Century - to provide for
seizure, storage and fate of animals and goods seized as a result of violation of local laws;
XIX. discipline and monitor, within its competence, sports competitions, concerts,
entertainment and public events of a similar nature conducted in public places;
XX. provide for the use of roads and public places;
XXI. discipline the local traffic, signaling the urban streets and highways of the Federal
District;
XXII. perform inspection and sanitary inspection of environmental attitude, tax, public security
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and labor for the operation of a business, industrial, service and similar, within its
competence, respecting the federal law;
XXIII. buy goods, including through expropriation, by necessity, utility or social interest, under
the legislation;
XXIV. license the construction of any work;
XXV. ban buildings in disrepair, unsanitary conditions and having the irregularities specified in
the legislation and to demolish buildings that threaten personal safety or health;
XXVI. to provide for outdoor advertising, particularly on display posters, advertisements and
other means of publicity or propaganda in public places, in public places or such visible.

CHAPTER III, Section II, Article 16
THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
It is the responsibility of the Federal District, in common with the Union:
I. to enforce the custody of the Federal Constitution, this Organic Law, the laws and democratic
institutions;
II. to save public property;
III. protect documents and other items of historical and cultural monuments, natural areas and
archaeological sites, and prevent his escape, destruction and distortion;
IV. protecting the environment and fight pollution in any of its forms;
V. to preserve the fauna, flora and savanna;
VI. to provide the means of access to culture, education and science;
VII. to provide health care to the population and the protection and guarantee to persons with
disabilities with the technical and financial cooperation of the Union;
VIII. to combat the causes of poverty, malnutrition and the factors of marginalization,
promoting the social integration of disadvantaged segments;
IX. promote agricultural production and organizing the food supply;
X. Promoting housing construction and improvement of housing conditions and sanitation;
XI. to record, monitor and supervise concessions of rights to exploration and exploitation of
water resources and minerals in his territory;
XII. to establish and implement an educational policy for traffic safety.

CHAPTER III, Section III, Article 17
THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
It is the Federal District, concurrently with the Union to legislate on:
I. tax, financial, penitentiary, economic and urban;
II. the budget;
III. Board of Trade;
IV. the cost of forensic services;
V. production and consumption;
VI. savannah, hunting, fishing, wildlife, nature conservation, protection of soil and natural
resources, environmental protection and pollution control;
VII. Protection of historical, cultural, artistic, agricultural and tourist;
VIII. liability for damage to the environment, and consumer goods and rights of artistic,
aesthetic, historic, cave exploration, tourism and landscape;
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IX. education, culture, education and sport;
X. social security, protection and defense of health;
XI. legal under the legislation in force;
XII. protection and social integration of persons with disabilities;
XIII. protection of children and youth;
XIV. maintaining order and internal security;
XV. procedures in procedural matters
XVI. organization, guarantees, rights and duties of the civil police.
§ 1 The Federal District, in the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, will observe the
general rules established by the Union
§ 2 If there is no federal law on general rules, the Federal District shall exercise full
legislative competence to meet their peculiarities.
§ 3 The occurrence of federal law over general rules suspending the effectiveness of local
law, as it is otherwise.
CHAPTER IV, Section I, Article 17
PROHIBITIONS
It is forbidden to the Federal District:
I. establish religious cults or churches, subsidize them, embarrass them or keep working with
them or their representatives relations of dependence or alliance, except, as provided by law,
the collaboration of public interest;
II. refuse to honor public documents;
III. to subsidize or assist in any manner, at public or the press, radio and television service,
speaker or any other means of communication, political propaganda or partisan purposes
other than public administration;
IV. donate your property or assets Constitute real burden on them, and to grant tax exemptions or
debt, without the express permission of the Legislative Chamber, on pain of nullity of the act.
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